On signing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Government of
1) Continues to be convinced that the same reasons which made it advisable to prohibit biological and chemical weapons jointly in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 exist now to strive to pursue identical methods with respect to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of the said weapons, as well as their elimination from the arsenals of all States.
2) Considers that the fact that the Convention now open for signature applies solely to biological and toxin weapons should be understood, as Resolution 2826 (XXVI) of the United Nations General Assembly, to which the Convention is annexed, explicitly indicates, to be merely a first step - the only one which it has proved possible to take for the time being - towards an agreement prohibiting also the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.
3) Makes a note of the fact that the Convention contains an express commitment to continue negotiations in good faith with the aim of arriving at any early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction.
4) Makes a note, furthermore, that the General Assembly, through its Resolution 2827 (XXVI), has requested the Conference of the Disarmament Committee to continue, as a high priority item, negotiations aimed at promptly reaching the agreement relative to chemical weapons which is being sought; and that, in Resolution 2827 B (XXVI), the General Assembly has urged all States to commit themselves, while the said agreement is being reached, to abstain from all additional development, production and stock-piling of those chemical substances capable of being used as weapons which, on account of their degree of toxicity, have the highest lethal effect and are not useable for peaceful purposes.
5) Is convinced that the success of the Convention relative to biological weapons will depend, in the last resort, on the manner in which the commitments under reference are honoured.